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An insurance company is a financial intermediary whose main line of business 
is the sale of a particular type of contingent contract, called an insurance pol- 
icy. Under this contract, the insurer promises to pay some amount to the policy- 
holder, or to some other beneficiary, following the occurrence of  an insured 
event. In the context of property-casualty insurance, the relevant insured events 
include, for example, the accidental destruction of the insured's property or the 
award of a liability judgment against the insured. In return for this promise the 
insured pays the insurer a premium. The premium and the earnings on the 
premium are then used by the insurer to cover its administrative costs, to pay 
the eventual loss claims that arise under the policy, and to provide a profit to 
the owners of the insurance company. 
During the 1980s, the federal income tax treatment of property-casualty in- 
surers and their policyholders underwent several important changes, the most 
significant of which came in 1986.  A priori reasoning suggests that the income 
tax treatment of insurance companies should affect equilibrium prices of insur- 
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ance. In this article we develop theoretical predictions for how these changes 
should have affected the equilibrium prices of property-casualty insurance pol- 
icies, and we explore the extent to which the theoretical predictions are re- 
flected in the available data on industry underwriting experience. 
One initial challenge presented by  our study is conceptual: In the case of 
property-casualty insurance, it is not  clear what  one means by  “price” or 
“quantity.” The annual premium received by  an insurance company in ex- 
change for the sale of a single one-year occurrence-based policy (i.e,, a policy 
that covers losses arising out of insured events that occur during the one-year 
period in which the policy is in force) can be understood as the product of a 
unit price for that type of coverage and the quantity of insurance embodied in 
the policy. But neither the price nor the quantity is directly observed. We take 
as a measure of the quantity of insurance contained in such a policy the total 
value of all the loss indemnity payments and loss expenses (such as attorneys’ 
fees) that the insurer expects to pay in connection with that policy. The price 
of the policy, then, is the ratio of the premium to this measure of quantity. Our 
analysis thus addresses the role of taxes in the determination of this ratio. 
For purposes of relating the predictions of theory to industry experience, we 
suffer from a lack of  information about what insurance companies actually 
expect to pay. What we have  instead are the companies’ reported premiums 
earned and their reported estimates of what they expect to pay in the future as 
a result of covered events that have occurred as of the date of the report. These 
estimates are provided annually both to state regulators and to the public on 
forms called “annual statements.” Annual statement (or “statutory”) account- 
ing data are also used by insurers in calculating their federal income tax liabil- 
ity, which; of course, is reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). (Our 
discussion of insurance accounting, of which there will necessarily be a fair 
amount, draws primarily from Mooney and Cohen 1991 and Troxel and Bou- 
chie 1990.) 
We divide the paper into four sections. In section 2.1 we set forth a precise, 
albeit stylized, description of  a property-casualty insurance policy and a de- 
tailed taxonomy of insurance prices and quantities. Understanding this taxon- 
omy will require a measure of patience and perseverance of the reader, but in 
our  view,  it is worth  the effort; in  any event, the  taxonomy  will be used 
throughout the remainder of the paper as well as in the appendixes. In section 
2.2 we use the taxonomy to describe two methods of accounting for the finan- 
cial results of a property-casualty insurer: statutory, or annual statement, ac- 
counting and nominal economic income accounting. In section 2.3 we summa- 
rize the federal income tax treatment of  property-casualty insurance com- 
panies, with an emphasis on certain important changes that were made as part 
of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 (TRA86). (The most important changes made 
by  TRA86 for our purposes were  the introduction of  the loss-reserve dis- 
counting requirement and the inclusion in taxable income of  20 percent of 
unearned premiums.) In section 2.3 we also discuss briefly the tax treatment 31  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
of liabilities that are not funded through property-casualty insurance, and we 
describe a significant change in those rules that was enacted in 1984. In section 
2.4 we develop the theory of how income taxes affect the break-even prices of 
insurance (with special attention to the changes made by TRA86). In section 
2.5 we present calculations of break-even prices based on the theory from sec- 
tion 2.4, and we compare those calculations with the historical record of the 
industry. The data consist of the losses incurred and loss adjustment expenses 
incurred (i.e., estimated loss payouts on existing policies) and the premiums 
earned by  U.S. property-casualty insurers during the period  1976-93.  The 
source of the data is the aggregated annual statement information published 
in Best5 Aggregates and Averages: Properly-Casualty. Various details of our 
procedures are described in appendixes. 
Our predictions regarding the effect of the TRA86 changes can be summa- 
rized as follows: (1) For all tax years after 1986 we would expect to see some 
increase in the break-even price of insurance, and we would expect the size of 
the increases to be positively correlated with the level of market interest rates 
and with the length of the “tail” of the given line of insurance. The predicted 
impact of  the changes in the tax rules enacted in 1986 translates into a tax 
on premiums (net of the cost of acquisition) of up to 13 percent (on medical 
malpractice, the longest tail line of insurance). (2) For the 1986 tax year, owing 
to a special transition rule in TRA86 called the “fresh start,” we would expect 
a  one-time reduction in  premiums, as the  fresh start essentially provided 
property-casualty insurers in 1986 with an extra incentive to issue policies dur- 
ing that year. Although we calculate economically meaningful impacts on the 
break-even terms of insurance policies, data on industry performance that we 
present show a sufficiently high degree of year-to-year variation (presumably 
reflecting the true riskiness of insurance, even in the aggregate) to swamp the 
impact of the changes in tax rules. 
2.1  Describing an Insurance Policy 
We begin our detailed description of a theoretical insurance policy by intro- 
ducing the concept of a spot policy: an insurance contract that covers the poli- 
cyholder for the stream of future loss payments that will arise out of a single 
specified loss event that has already occurred. A standard policy is our term 
for a group of spot policies sold by an insurance company to a single insured 
as a package for a given policy period, typically one year. Thus, under a stan- 
dard policy, in exchange for a premium payment from the insured, the insurer 
agrees to issue individual spot policies for any insured loss event that occurs 
during the policy period.’ We treat the premium for a standard policy as being 
1. The standard policy is the formalization of  a typical insurance policy, such as a one-year 
occurrence-based commercial general liability policy. Such a policy, when issued, in effect obli- 
gates the insurer to issue what we call spot policies during the year to “fund losses as they occur. 
Insurers rarely issue individual spot policies outside of the context of a standard policy, although 32  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Lope 
paid to the insurer on the date that the policy is written. This premium can be 
understood as a forward purchase of  a package of  spot policies. With a real 
insurance contract, the stream of loss payments associated with a covered event 
will not be known with certainty. Since the tax law changes we consider have 
related solely to the treatment of the timing of cash flows and not to the treat- 
ment of risk, we focus on the special case in which the loss profile is known 
with certainty to the insurance company.2 
We describe the losses covered by a spot policy or standard policy in terms 
of the policy’s cumulative loss payments, L(  a),  where L(t)  specifies the cumula- 
tive cash outflow of loss payments made by time t,  measured from the date of 
writing the policy. (Except where we specify otherwise, the term loss payment 
should be understood as gross of the insurance company’s allocated loss adjust- 
ment expenses.) We  use the term Zoss  profile to refer to the function that de- 
scribes the increases in L over time, that is, the function that describes the 
actual cash outflows. We denote by l(t)  the path of such payments as a function 
of time elapsed since the moment of writing. This may be a continuous func- 
tion that expresses the rate of payment per unit time (so that the payment during 
the short time, dt, after t is given by the product l(t)dt)  or, more typically for 
our application, may  consist of  a  sequence of  payments at  specified time 
points. (The loss profile bears the same relationship to the cumulative loss pay- 
ments as does a density or probability function to a cumulative distribution 
function.) 
2.1.1  Insurance Quantity Defined: Spot Policies 
L(m)  is*the  sum of all the loss payments on the policy, which, if the meaning 
is clear from the context, we denote as simply L. Then the normalized  loss 
profk,  l(t)/L,  sums to one. If two different policies, characterized by loss pro- 
files ll(t)  and 12(t),  have the same normalized loss profiles, we say they are in 
the same line of insurance policies. This terminology is intended to capture the 
idea that a line of insurance (such as medical malpractice) consists of policies 
with similar anticipated time profiles of payouts (with the same length of tail, 
e.g.). We  refer to the loss profile in a line that sums to one as the unit projile 
for that line; a policy that has the unit profile is a unit policy in a line. The loss 
profile of any policy in a line is then a multiple, L, of the unit profile, and so it 
something approximating such policies does exist. E.g., retroactive insurance policies, which are 
issued after a loss event has occurred as a means of  funding the liability through a property- 
casualty insurer, are relatively rare but not unprecedented. Such a policy approximates the eco- 
nomics of a spot policy, although a retroactive policy can still entail a fair amount of  uncertainty 
regarding the total amount and the timing of loss payments. For the sake of simplicity, our analysis 
assumes away such uncertainty. 
2. For discussions of the pricing of the risk associated with loss and unearned premium reserves, 
see Butsic (1991), D’Arcy (1988), and Kraus and Ross (1982). For arguments that the tax law 
changes we are considering should have had their principal, if not their only, impact on the purely 
intertemporal aspects of transactions, see, e.g., Gordon (1985) and Bradford (1995). 33  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
Table 2.1  Loss Profile for Automobile Liability 
Time Relative to  Payment 
Accident Year (AY)  during Year 
AY  + 0 
AY  + 1 
AY  + 2 
AY  + 3 
AY  + 4 
AY  + 5 








Total  .99 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on A. M. Best Company (various years). 
is meaningful to speak of L as the quantity of insurance embodied in a policy 
in a line. 
Any given spot policy can be understood as a quantity of unit policies in the 
relevant line. A unit policy in a line, such as automobile liability, pays a total 
of $1 over time, with the time pattern characteristic of the line. For example, 
the industry average unit loss profile for an auto liability spot policy in the 
period we are studying is shown in table 2.1. 
2.1.2 
Let P stand for the premium received by the company (net of selling costs) 
at the moment of writing a spot policy with a particular loss profile l(*).  The 
single premium buys a whole profile of loss payments. (When we want to em- 
phasize that the premium pays for losses that have already been incurred as of 
the date of writing, we refer to it as a spot premium, in contrast with the pre- 
mium paid on a standard insurance policy.) Just as it is meaningful to speak of 
the quantity of insurance in a spot policy within a given line, so we can speak 
of  the price of  insurance implicit in the policy. It is simply the ratio of  the 
premium to the total anticipated losses: 
Insurance Prices Defined: Spot Policies 
P 
p=  E‘ 
In our terminology, the premium on a given policy is not the price. It is like 
the amount paid for a quantity of potatoes, the product of a per unit price and 
a number of units purchased. The price of a policy in a line of insurance is the 
premium on a unit policy. 
A unit single-paymentpolicy in a line pays off exactly one at the payoff time 
characteristic of the line, which, by  analogy with bond terminology, we refer 
to as the policy’s maturiq. In fact, we shall make great use of  the analogy, 
noted by others, between the sale of a policy by an insurance company and a 34  David E  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
loan from policyholder to company, the premium being lent against repayment 
in the form of policy payoffs (see, eg,  Cummins and Grace 1994). The unit 
single-payment policy that pays off at T corresponds to a discount $1 bond 
maturing at T. Each unit policy, in turn, can be understood as composed of a 
sum of quantities of single-payment unit policies. 
2.1.3 
Just as a spot policy can be understood as a package of single-payment  poli- 
cies, as discussed above, a standard policy can be understood as a package of 
spot policies. Thus, for example, under an auto liability policy written on 1 
September 1987, a company might have expected to accumulate $40 in  in- 
curred losses for each passing day, or $40 x 365 = $1,460 in incurred losses 
during the policy year. We can think of the premium as a forward purchase of 
the package of  spot policies. The parties to a standard policy are generally 
uncertain about the size of the spot policies that will come into being as a result 
of events during the policy year (e.g.,  a fire that damages a factory), and for 
each of those spot policies, they will generally be uncertain about the amount 
and time profile of the loss payments and expenses (it takes time to determine 
the amount of the covered damages, which may be paid out over a course of 
years). Of  course, the company has a good idea of what those losses are going 
to be, and we might express this idea in probabilistic terms. As was the case 
for the description of a spot policy, however, it eases exposition and analysis 
to assume it known that each day (or moment) during the policy year will add 
one identical spot policy to the company’s liabilities. And each of those spot 
policies involves a known and certain profile of loss payments. 
Thus a standard policy can be built up from unit spot policies, which can in 
turn be built up from unit single-payment spot policies. By direct analogy with 
a spot policy, we define as a unit standard policy in a line a policy on which 
the losses over the policy year aggregate to one. 
Standard Policies: Prices and Quantities 
2.2  Accounting for Insurance Policies 
To  understand the taxation of  an insurance company and to interpret the 
available data, we need to express the ideas just discussed in terms of the fi- 
nancial, regulatory, and tax accounting of the company. Our eventual goal is to 
be able to account for a standard policy, but we will begin with the accounting 
for a spot policy and build from there. 
2.2.1 
Thus we  start with the simplified example of  an insurance company that 
issues a spot policy characterized by  loss profile Z(.).  At that moment, the in- 
surer will add to its balance sheet a new asset, the premium receivable, P, and 
a new liability, the obligation to pay out I(-)  over time. In terms of  statutory 
accounting, the balance sheet entry corresponding to this new liability is the 
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unpaid losses account, sometimes referred to as the insurer’s loss reserve. If 
the sole purpose of the insurer’s reported loss reserve were to reflect the market 
value of the new liability, the reserve would presumably be carried as the dis- 
counted value of the loss payouts, El(t)e-“dt,  where r is the going interest rate 
(for simplicity, assumed constant in this formula). As we discuss below, that 
amount also represents the break-even spot premium for this policy in a system 
without taxes. Therefore, when an insurer writes a break-even spot policy un- 
der these assumptions, it would have  no net effect on the insurer’s balance 
sheet, as the values of  the new liability and the new asset would be directly 
offsetting. More generally, the discounted loss reserve associated with a policy 
represents the discounted value of  the payments remaining to be made as of 
any particular time in the life of the policy. 
Note, however, that the rules of statutory accounting applied by state regula- 
tors require the use of undiscounted loss reserves for regulatory reporting pur- 
poses. Thus, when reporting the loss reserve for a given spot policy as of time 
t’  (relative to the date of the loss) on its regulatory balance sheet, the insurer 
must use the simple sum of all anticipated future loss payments associated with 
that policy, rZ(t)  dt. The value of this undiscounted loss reserve will exceed the 
value of  the discounted loss reserve, and the amount of the difference will 
depend on the applicable interest rate and the length of  the tail of  the spot 
policy in question. As we show in considerable detail below, at interest rates 
that are high but within historical precedent and for a long-tailed policy (such 
as medical malpractice), the difference can be ~ubstantial.~ 
An insurance company’s loss reserve is a stock concept; it is a liability, the 
value of which can be measured at any given time. The income calculation of 
a company, corresponding to this balance sheet accounting, is obtained by tak- 
ing year-to-year differences. Thus the premiums taken in during the year will 
be added in, and the increase in outstanding loss reserves will be deducted. 
This is the conceptual basis for the loss reserve deduction in the calculation of 
taxable income. 
An insurance company’s total annual income is the sum of its underwriting 
income  and  investment  income.  Investment income is  simply the  amount 
3. If we  let R(t) stand for the amount remaining to be paid on a policy, then writing the policy 
increases the company’s net worth according to statutory accounting rules by  P -  R (0). Time- 
value of money considerations  lead us to expect R(0)  to be greater than P, so the effect of writing 
a policy is expected to reduce net worth under statutory accounting. In order to meet statutory 
solvency requirements, the company must have some capital of  its own to balance sufficiently 
the negative effect of writing a policy. Thus the conservative accounting conventions imposed by 
regulation, coupled with accounting net worth restrictions, have the effect of  obliging companies 
to hold collateral against their more distant obligations to pay out under the policy. We  offer two 
justifications for not attempting to model the impact of the corporation income tax system on the 
yield of this obligatory collateral. First, for an insurance company that is part of a larger group, 
the collateral requirement is unlikely to add to the equity desired by the group as a whole (so  there 
is no extra tax cost). Second, under the “Miller equilibrium”  hypothesis (Miller 1977), sharehold- 
ers are indifferent between the after-tax returns on debt and on equity. For them, the collateral, 
taxed at the corporate level, yields a competitive  rate of return. 36  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
earned by  the insurer on invested premiums and reinvested earnings, net of 
investment expenses. Underwriting income is calculated by taking the differ- 
ence between premiums earned and underwriting expenses incurred during the 
year. And typically one of the largest underwriting expense deductions, the loss 
reserve deduction, is the increase in outstanding loss reserves during the year. 
2.2.2  Accounting for a Standard Insurance Policy 
When we move from the accounting for a spot policy to the accounting for 
a standard policy, things get more complicated. The sale of a standard policy 
is, in essence, the advanced sale of a series of spot policies to be issued as time 
passes. Thus, at the precise moment the standard policy is issued to the insured, 
assuming the premium is paid at the moment of issuance, the insurance com- 
pany for a brief time has an asset (in the form of  the premium) with no off- 
setting loss reserve liabilities. Those liabilities are incurred only as time passes 
and as the implicit (or hypothetical) spot policies are issued over the course of 
the policy period (which, again, is typically one year). Therefore, at the mo- 
ment the standard policy is issued, the offsetting liability is the obligation to 
provide the implicit spot policies over time. Statutory accounting deals with 
this obligation through a balance sheet entry called the unearned premium 
reserve. 
By  convention, the premium on a standard insurance policy is treated as 
earned, and the unearned premium reserve is correspondingly reduced, pro rata 
during the policy year. During that time, spot policy loss liabilities are in- 
curred, giving rise to loss payments and loss reserves for unpaid losses. In 
arriving at its annual underwriting income, an insurer deducts from premiums 
accrued  the  year-over-year increase  in  the  company’s  unearned  premium 
reserve (in addition to the year-over-year increase in loss reserves). 
2.2.3  From Spot Prices to Earned Premiums and Incurred Losses by 
Accident Year 
Statutory accounts present reports on an insurance company’s earned premi- 
ums and incurred losses, categorized by accident year. The term accident year 
refers to the calendar year during which losses were incurred under policies 
issued by the company. The premiums earned during an accident year consist 
of the allocated fractions of the premiums on standard policies that cover any 
part of  the calendar year in question. Because of  the convention of  assuming 
that a premium is earned at an even rate over the policy year, if the spot premi- 
ums are changing the premiums earned during an accident year may not be 
exactly the same as the sum of implicit spot premiums charged for the cover- 
age. (The way we deal with this in our calculated prices is detailed in appen- 
dix B.) 
2.2.4  Accounting and Economic Income Concepts 
As mentioned above, under the insurance accounting rules that govern the cal- 
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take loss reserve deductions on an undiscounted basis. Accordingly, statutory ac- 
counting has the effect of accelerating deductions when compared with nominal 
economic income accounting.  As we define the term, the nominal economic in- 
come of a company is the sum of all cash payments to the company’s owners and 
the increase in the market valu;  of the company’s assets net of liabilities during 
the year. For a company that makes no distributions to its owners, nominal eco- 
nomic income is simply the year-to-year change in its net worth when all assets 
and liabilities are accounted for at their current market value. Nominal economic 
income may be contrasted with economic income, as the term is often used in 
discussions of tax policy. As applied to a firm, economic income means the sum 
of  distributions to owners and the annual change in the firm’s net worth, cor- 
rected  for injution-that  is, with all the elements measured in constant purchas- 
ing power units. For our purposes, nominal economic income is the relevant con- 
cept, since all ordinary borrowing and lending transactions are accounted for in 
the tax law according to nominal economic income rules.4 
The effect of the inconsistency between nominal economic income account- 
ing and statutory accounting can be seen in the following simple example. 
Imagine an insurance company that issues one identical insurance policy every 
year, that invests all cash inflows at the going constant rate of interest, and that, 
contrary to the regulatory requirements, has no capital of its own other than 
accumulation from premiums and earnings on premiums (i.e.,  the insurer 
maintains no surplus). If we then look at the balance sheet of this company 
at the end of  any given year, we will see a stock of  assets consisting of  the 
accumulations from past and current premium receipts, plus interest earned on 
those invested premiums, net of loss (and loss expense) outlays. In a competi- 
tive market, the assets on hand will just equal the discounted value of the un- 
paid losses on the stock of policies. Thus, the market value of this package of 
assets and liabilities will be zero every year. What is more, the company’s nom- 
inal economic income (the annual change in the market value of its assets and 
liabilities-the  company is paying out nothing to its owners) will also be zero. 
In contrast, the net worth of the company understood in statutory accounting 
terms will be negative. Indeed, under the assumptions of the example, it will 
be the same negative amount each year (since the company issues identical 
policies each year). Moreover, after the start-up years, the statutory annual in- 
come of the insurer will also be zero. (During the start-up years, the statutory 
income would be negative.) If the insurer were then to stop writing these hypo- 
thetical yearly policies, statutory accounting and nominal economic account- 
ing would diverge. Under nominal economic income accounting, the value of 
the insurer’s portfolio of  assets and liabilities would remain at zero, and the 
insurer’s nominal economic income would continue to be zero from year to 
year as the old policies were paid off. Under statutory accounting, however, 
4. When other transactions are accounted for on other bases, tax arbitrage will give rise to biases 
in the portfolios of taxpayers in different situations and to differences in market yields on various 
financial products according to the tax circumstances of the holder (Bradford 1981). 38  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
the insurer’s income would be  positive, since it would have earnings on its 
assets and any loss payment would be associated with an offsetting reduction 
in the stock of unpaid losses, with a corresponding addition to statutory income 
at that point. Conversely, if  the company started expanding its business, its 
nominal economic income would remain zero, but its statutory income would 
be negative. 
The inconsistencies between nominal economic accounting and statutory 
accounting are especially significant because, before TRA86, the federal in- 
come tax treatment of property-casualty insurance companies essentially repli- 
cated statutory accounting. Section 2.3 summarizes the federal income tax 
treatment of  property-casualty insurance companies, and it emphasizes how 
that treatment was changed by  TRA86. Section 2.3 also discusses briefly a 
change that took place in 1984 in the tax treatment of  liabilities not funded 
through property-casualty insurance policies. 
2.3  Federal Income Tax Treatment of Property-Casualty Insurance 
2.3.1  Tax Treatment of Property-Casualty  Insurance Companies 
The federal income tax treatment of property-casualty  insurance companies 
is governed by a special set of rules that are collected in subchapter L of the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Under subchapter L, insurers are generally re- 
quired to calculate their taxable income using the same statutory accounting 
conventions required by  state regulators, which we described in section 2.2. 
As mentioned in that section, statutory accounting requires an insurer to calcu- 
late its annual income by taking into account both its net underwriting profit 
(or loss) and its net investment income (or loss) for a given reporting yeal; that 
is, the year for which the annual statement report is filed-which  coincides 
with the insurer’s tux yea< Consistent with statutory accounting, an insurer’s 
year-end underwriting income is determined roughly as follows: 
1. Start with premiums  written during the reporting year (in our model, 
these are the premiums received on issuance of a standard policy) less 
2.  Premium acquisition expenses incurred during the reporting year (these 
are the up-front costs of selling the policy such as commissions) less 
3. The increase in the insurer’s unearned premium account during the re- 
porting year less 
4.  The increase in the insurer’s unpaid losses account during the reporting 
year (this is the loss reserve deduction mentioned section 2.2, i.e., the net in- 
crease during that reporting year in the insurer’s estimate of its future claim 
payments) less 
5. Any actual paid losses that occurred during the reporting yea? 
5. The sum of items 4 and 5 for a given reporting year is referred to in statutory accounting as 
the losses incurred. 39  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
The result of this calculation-the  insurer’s net underwriting income-is  then 
added to net investment income (which is simply the difference between in- 
vestment earnings and investment expenses) to get taxable income. 
Until the enactment of TRA86, subchapter L permitted property-casualty 
companies to calculate their loss reserve deductions on an undiscounted basis, 
just as they have always been required to do for regulatory purposes. That is, 
for tax purposes an insurer simply deducted the difference between the begin- 
ning balance and ending balance in its unpaid losses account, without taking 
into account the fact that those liabilities represented payments to be made in 
the future. This rule had the effect of  giving property-casualty insurers the 
benefit of  the inconsistency between statutory accounting and nominal eco- 
nomic income accounting described above. 
In the early and mid-l980s,  in various reports to Congress it was argued 
that, as a result of this inconsistency between statutory accounting and nominal 
economic income accounting, (1) the property-casualty industry had for years 
been paying less in federal income taxes than it should have been and (2) a 
bias in favor of funding risks through property-casualty companies had been 
created.6  At least in part on the basis of such arguments, Congress included in 
TRA86 a requirement that for all tax years after 1986, all loss reserve deduc- 
tions must be calculated on a discounted basis. For any post-1986 tax year, 
the loss reserve deduction is determined by taking the difference between the 
discounted value of the beginning balance in the unpaid losses account and the 
discounted value of the ending balance in that account. 
Thus the post- 1986 treatment of  loss reserves approximates the treatment 
required by nominal economic income accounting. Differences remain, how- 
ever. For example, TRA86 and the Treasury regulations that have been promul- 
gated under it contain fairly specific rules limiting how the discounting re- 
quirement may be implemented. The insurer must use discount factors that are 
published periodically by  the Treasury Department. (Those discount factors 
may diverge from the actually prevailing rates.) And the insurer must, with 
some exceptions, use the “loss payment patterns” (or, to use our terminology, 
the loss profiles) that are also published every few years by the Treasury. Those 
loss profiles-there  is a separate profile for each line of insurance-are  calcu- 
lated by the Treasury using data from previously filed annual statements for 
the entire industry. Under some circumstances an insurer can elect to use its 
own historical loss experience in calculating the profile for purposes of  dis- 
counting; however, many insurers cannot qualify for that ~ption.~ 
6. This argument was  made, for example, in  a very  influential report to Congress issued by 
the General Accounting Office (GAO 1985). The loss-reserve discounting requirement ultimately 
enacted by Congress (discussed below in the text) essentially adopted the GAO proposal. 
7. In applying the Treasury’s discount factors to its statutory loss reserves, the insurer is allowed 
to take into account the extent to which the reserves were already discounted on the annual state- 
ment. As we have already noted, however, most state regulatory authorities do not permit dis- 
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In addition, a special transition rule-called  the fresh star?-was  inserted 
in TRA86. This rule essentially permitted insurers a second deduction (spread 
out over a number of  years) equal to the difference between the discounted 
value and the undiscounted value of the total year-end 1986 loss reserves. In 
the absence of the fresh-start rule, the introduction of the reserve-discounting 
requirement would have produced a large lump-sum tax on property-casualty 
insurers for the 1986 tax year. When total year-end reserves were required to 
be discounted to present value, instead of a fresh start there would have been a 
large loss reserve inclusion in gross income equal to the amount of  the dis- 
count.* However, Congress chose to permit insurers to exclude that amount 
from gross income. 
In addition to the loss-reserve discounting requirement, TRA86 also made a 
number of  other changes in the tax treatment of property-casualty insurers. 
Prominent among these for our purposes was the change in the treatment of the 
unearned premium reserve? Before TRA86, subchapter L permitted insurers to 
deduct the full value of the annual increase in their unearned premium reserve, 
thereby excluding from income revenue that had not yet been accrued. In both 
committee reports accompanying TRA86, it was contended that this ability to 
exclude unearned premiums, coupled with the allowance of an up-front deduc- 
tion for premium acquisition expenses, resulted in a mismatching of income 
and expenses (U.S. Congress 1984).  Therefore, in an  effort to produce a rough 
matching of income and expense, a provision was included in TRA86 in effect 
reducing the annual unearned premium reserve deduction by 20 percent. 
We  would, a priori, expect both of  these changes in the tax treatment of 
property-casualty insurers-the  loss-reserve  discounting  requirement  and 
unearned premium inclusion-to  have  effects on break-even prices in the 
property-casualty  market. In section 2.4 below, where we discuss the effect of 
taxes on break-even prices generally, we also set forth specifically our predic- 
tions regarding the effects of  these changes. (In general, we would expect a 
decrease in prices in 1986-due  to the fresh start-and  an eventual increase 
in break-even prices in the years thereafter owing to the switch to discounted 
reserves.) Then in  section 2.5 we  explore the extent to which the  actual 
industry-wide aggregate data-taken  from Best’s Aggregates and Averages- 
match our predictions. 
8. This inclusion would have been required by IRC section 481(a). When there is a change in 
accounting methods that would otherwise permit double deductions, section 481(a) provides a 
method by which the effect of the second deduction can be eliminated or at least reduced. There- 
fore, absent the fresh-start  rule in TRA86, section 481(a) would have required all property-casualty 
insurers either to include the amount of the discount in income in 1986 or, at least, to include the 
amount of the discount over a period of years. The fresh-start rule essentially trumped the effect 
of section 481(a). 
9. One change that we will not deal with in this paper involved insurers’ tax-exempt income. 
TRA86 required property-casualty insurers to include 15 percent of what was previously exempt 
interest income from state and local government bonds and from untaxed dividends. Other major 
tax changes in 1986 that affected property-casualty insurers were the reduction in corporate rates 
(from 46 percent in 1986 to 40 percent in 1987 and to 34 percent in 1988) and the introduction of 
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Before turning to section 2.4, however, we briefly summarize another inter- 
esting change in the tax  laws that  occurred in the  1980s-specifically  in 
1984-which  we would expect to have some (albeit small) effect on equilib- 
rium property-casualty  prices, although we do not attempt to model this effect 
in section 2.4. 
2.3.2  Tax Treatment of Liabilities  Not Funded through Property-Casualty 
Insurance Companies 
Thus far we have been discussing the economics and accounting of how a 
business or  an individual might fund certain types of  liabilities through a 
property-casualty insurance policy. And in the previous subsection we ex- 
plained how the pre-TM86 tax rules for property-casualty companies created 
a bias in the direction of funding risks in that manner (at least as compared to 
the incentives that would have existed under a nominal economic income tax). 
In this subsection we explain how a fundamental change in the tax treatment of 
liabilities accrued by noninsurance companies-that  is, liabilities not funded 
through a property-casualty  company-that  was enacted  in 1984  should have in- 
creased, if only temporarily,  that bias in favor of property-casualty  risk funding. 
Before the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of  1984 (TRA84), businesses 
that used the accrual method of accounting for federal tax purposes could, in a 
very rough way, approximate the accelerated deductions available to property- 
casualty insurance companies. This acceleration of deductions resulted from 
the application of the traditional “all-events test,” which determines generally 
the timing of  deductions taken by  accrual method taxpayers. Under the pre- 
TRA84 version of this test, an accrual method taxpayer could deduct a liability 
in the year in which (1) all events necessary to fix the liability had occurred 
and (2) the amount of the liability could be determined with reasonable accu- 
racy. Thus, for example, whenever the taxpayer entered into a binding contract 
to make a fixed payment in the future, the taxpayer could-in  the year of con- 
tracting-deduct  the undiscounted face value of  the future payment, even if 
the payment was not to be made for several years. 
To illustrate the effect of this rule, consider the following example of a struc- 
tured settlement  arrangement that might have occurred before TRA84: An indi- 
vidual is injured on 1 January in year 1 by a product manufactured by Company 
X. Assume that the company and the individual agree to settle the claim for 
$823 to be paid by the company to the individual on 3 1 December of that year. 
Assume further, for the sake of the example, that the before-tax rate of interest 
on all investments is 10 percent, that all investments (of both the company and 
the injured individual) are subject to income tax, and that the marginal tax rate 
for all taxpayers is 50 percent. Thus the after-tax interest rate of return on all 
investments is 5 percent. 
Under the all-events test (as it was applied before the enactment of TRA84), 
these facts would give rise to the following tax-planning opportunity: The par- 
ties could agree that, instead of the $823 cash payment in year 1, the company 
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vided that the company was solvent and likely to remain solvent, the injured 
party would be indifferent between these two payment options because they 
have the same present value, discounting at the after-tax interest rate. If  the 
parties agree to this deferred payment arrangement, the company could then 
take the full $1,000 deduction on its year 1 tax return. 
Assuming the company has income in year  1 against which to offset the 
deduction, the deduction would save the insurer $500 in taxes in that year. The 
company then combines this $500 with $323 of its own money and invests the 
sum at the after-tax rate of 5 percent per year. By the end of year 5, the money 
will have grown to $1,000 under the current assumptions, the amount neces- 
sary to satisfy the company’s obligation to the injured party. Thus, the out-of- 
pocket after-tax cost to the taxpayer of this liability would be only $323. 
Under the nominal economic income treatment of this structured settlement 
transaction, the company would be permitted a deduction of  $683 on its year 
1 tax return ($1,000 discounted for four years at the  10 percent before-tax 
interest rate) and an additional deduction each year (through year 5)  equal to 
the annual increase in the present value of the liability resulting from the pas- 
sage of time. The discounted present value of the tax saving amounts to $458 
in year 1. Thus, by investing these tax savings and $365 of  its own money in 
year  1 (at 5 percent after tax), the company could generate the necessary 
$1,000 by the end of  year 5. Thus, one measure of the tax-deferral effect of 
this particular structured settlement agreement is the difference between the 
after-tax cost to the taxpayer under nominal economic income taxation ($365) 
and  the after-tax cost to the taxpayer under the pre-TRAM all-events test 
($323)-the  difference being $42 in this example. 
The strbctured settlement represents an extreme example of the tax deferral 
available under the old all-events test. To  achieve the degree of  tax deferral 
described in the example above, however, it was necessary for the company 
not only to be aware of the liability but also to enter into the structured settle- 
ment contract with the injured party. Such contracts probably accounted for a 
relatively small portion of the total amount of risk funding in the pre-TRA84 
years. Note, however, that a structured settlement was not the only means of 
accelerating  deductions under the pre-TM84 all-events test. In addition, there 
was  a considerable amount of  pre-TRA84 case law that had the effect of 
allowing accrual method taxpayers to deduct certain liabilities that called for 
the taxpayer to make payouts far into the future. 
For example, one court held that the all-events test was satisfied-the  liabil- 
ity was fixed-with  respect to a company’s self-insured workers’ compensa- 
tion liabilities in the year in which the injury occurred, provided that those 
liabilities were uncontested.’O Moreover, courts have generally held that the 
10. Crescenr Wharf& Warehouse Co. v.  Cornrnissioneq 518 E2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975). Generally, 
a taxpayer may not deduct amounts set aside as a self-insurance  reserve for expected future costs. 
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length of time between accrual and payment does not affect whether the deduc- 
tion could be taken or for how much. As will be discussed below, this result 
approached (without quite equaling) the treatment available to insurers under 
pre-TRA86 subchapter L. (The main difference was that an insurer could have 
deducted the workers’ compensation liability even if the claims had been con- 
tested.) 
Thus, for workers’ compensation liabilities, to a lesser extent for tort liabili- 
ties, and for other liabilities as well, taxpayers before TRA84 could exploit the 
old all-events test and defer taxes by  taking deductions years in advance of 
payments (U.S. Congress 1984). 
In  1984 Congress introduced the “economic performance” requirement, 
which largely eliminated  the tax-deferral  opportunities  described above in con- 
nection with the old all-events test.” The economic performance requirement, 
found in IRC section 461(h), altered the timing of large classes of deductions 
under the old all-events test. Section 461(h) provides generally that an accrual 
method taxpayer can deduct an expense no earlier than the year in which eco- 
nomic performance occurs with respect to that expense.’*  With respect to the 
timing of deductions for tort liabilities, workers’ compensation liabilities, and 
breach-of-contract  liabilities specifically, however, the economic performance 
requirement essentially placed  all  taxpayers on  the  cash-receipts-and-dis- 
bursements method of  accounting. Thus, for post- 1984 tax years, liabilities 
arising out of  tort claims, workers’ compensation claims, or contract claims 
can be deducted only when payment is actually made by the taxpayer to the 
party to whom the liability is owed: a tort liability, for example, may be de- 
ducted no earlier than the year in which the taxpayer actually pays the tort 
award (or settlement amount) to the tort plaintiff. 
Note that under the economic performance rule, the company in the struc- 
tured settlement example above would been required to delay the $1,000 tax 
deduction until the year of actual payment-year  5. In that case (holding all 
other assumptions the same), the after-tax cost to the self-insurer of the struc- 
tured settlement arrangement would have been $41  1. This is because the pres- 
ent value in year 1 of the delayed tax deduction would be $411, and as noted 
above, a total of $823 is needed in year 1  to fund the $1,000 payment in year 5. 
Finally, consider how the manufacturer in the structured settlement example 
above could have funded its tort liability through a property-casualty insurance 
11. Under IRC section 468B,  companies that have tort liabilities can still generate tax benefits 
by  making qualified payments to a “designated settlement fund.” However, the companies must 
comply with a set of complicated and restrictive regulatory requirements, and the  size of the tax 
savings of a designated settlement fund are  considerably smaller than the  tax savings that were 
possible under the old all-events test. 
12. The general rules for determining when economic performance occurs are straightforward 
If the taxpayer’s expense arises out of the provision of services to (or by) the taxpayer, economic 
performance occurs as the  services are  rendered. If  the expense arises out of  the  provision of 
property to (or the use of property by) the taxpayer, economic performance occurs as the property 
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company rather than through self-funding. Make the following assumptions: 
(1) Just before the occurrence of the injury (at the end of year l), the manufac- 
turer purchased an occurrence-based commercial general liability insurance 
policy from a property-casualty insurance company. (2) The injury (caused by 
the manufacturer’s product) is covered under the policy. (3) The insurer esti- 
mates that the covered injury will give rise to a single $1,000 payment to be 
made four years later, at the end of year 5.13  (4) The premium charged by the 
insurer is equal to $645, the break-even premium, given statutory accounting 
for insurance company income.I4 (5) The insurance premium is deductible as 
an ordinary and necessary business expense on the manufacturer’s year 1 tax 
return. Under these assumptions, the $645 deduction would save the manufac- 
turer $322 in taxes. Thus the after-tax cost to the manufacturer of funding the 
liability through the property-casualty policy is $323. Under these assump- 
tions, then, the after-tax cost of  funding the liability through the property- 
casualty insurer and the after-tax cost of  self-funding it (in the event a struc- 
tured settlement could be arranged) were the same. 
Because of the changes made by TRA84 (which were made effective for 
deductions that would have been allowable after 18 July 1984 under the prior 
rules), we would expect the cost of self-funding certain types of liabilities (es- 
pecially  tort, workers’  compensation, and breach-of-contract liabilities) to 
have increased in  1984 and subsequent years. Likewise, the relative cost of 
funding such liabilities through property-casualty insurance policies should 
have decreased around that time. Therefore, we would expect to see an increase 
in the quantity of  liability insurance (especially in the general liability and 
workers’ compensation lines) that was supplied and demanded in 1984, 1985, 
and 1986. 
That quantity effect, however, might be de minimis because of the relatively 
small magnitude of  the change. That is, it may be that the discussion above 
overstates the extent to which non-insurance  company taxpayers were, pre- 
TRA84, able to accelerate the deduction of accrued liabilities. Also, the quan- 
tity effect may  be offset to some extent by  the price effects caused by  the 
changes in TRA86, which will be discussed in section 2.4. 
2.4  Effect of Taxes on Break-Even Prices 
As mentioned in section 2.3, one would expect generally that tax rules will 
influence both  the  break-even  spot  prices  of  property-casualty insurance 
(where the treatment of loss reserves is critical) and the relationship between 
break-even spot prices and break-even standard premiums (where the main 
issue is the treatment of unearned premium reserves). We treat the two pieces 
13. Perhaps it will take five years for the litigation to run its course; or, in some cases, it may 
14. In section 2.4 we explain how the insurance premium depends on the tax treatment of the 
take five years for the victim to discover the injury. 
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separately, starting with the effect of taxes on break-even spot prices. Note one 
critical assumption of  this section and of  the paper as a whole: we assume 
throughout that in setting their reported loss reserves and unearned premium 
reserves insurers show no systematic bias. That is, we assume they are not 
influenced in any direction by the possible effects of  these reported numbers 
on their tax liabilities, their likelihood of regulatory review, or their financial 
status in the capital markets. In future work, we hope to isolate the discretion- 
ary element in loss-reserving decisions and to measure the direction and extent 
of various biasing factors, such as taxes and regulatory concerns. But for now, 
an absence of bias is as~umed.'~ 
2.4.1  Break-Even Spot Prices 
Break-Even Spot Prices with No Taxes 
By a simple arbitrage argument, the break-even premium on a spot policy 
with known loss profile is simply the discounted value of the losses. Let r(t) 
be the yield curve in the bond market at the time of writing a single-payment 
policy, understood as the average annual yield on a zero-coupon bond that pays 
off t years in the future. Then, the break-even condition is 
This condition expresses the effect of a time-varying discount rate. Note that 
there is no question of  predicting future interest involved. The valuation of 
the cash flow  of  losses is based on the interest rates at the time of  writing 
the policy. 
Provided the time shape is fixed, the price of a spot policy at any given time 
is determined in this simple model by the yield curve at that time. The frame- 
work permits analysis of the effects of changes in the yield curve on different 
standardized time shapes (e.g., medical malpractice, workers' compensation), 
as well as variation in the time shape of policies, for example, a lengthening 
of the payment tail on some line. If the discount rate in the market is the same, 
r, for all maturities, the break-even condition is 
For the special case of a unit single-payment spot policy, that is, a policy that 
pays off at exactly one point in time, maturing at T (measured from the time 
of writing), the break-even premium (the unit price for that line) is 
P(r> = e-rT. 
15. For a review of aggregate industry data suggesting that reported loss reserves may be biased 
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Break-Even Spot Prices with Taxes 
In the calculation of the company’s taxable income, gross underwriting in- 
come consists of premiums earned. A deduction is allowed on account of any 
increase in the liabilities for future loss payments; that is the loss reserve de- 
duction. We may start by considering the case in which taxable income is the 
same as nominal economic income, as defined above. We  then consider sig- 
nificant deviations in the rules from the nominal economic income standard. 
Taxes with nominal economic income accounting. When we introduce an in- 
come tax,  we must translate the analysis of cash flows in a single-payment spot 
policy to net-of-tax terms. If the income tax were actually based on nominal 
economic income, then the insurance company that issued a policy on break- 
even terms in the absence of taxes, and fully hedged its position by buying a 
portfolio of  bonds with maturities matching its payment obligations, would 
not have any income at any point and would not pay any tax. So, under those 
circumstances, the tax would not affect the equilibrium price of insurance (ex- 
cept possibly indirectly, through an effect on the level of interest rates). Trans- 
lated into terms of  gross income and deductions, the premium, P, would be 
included as gross income and the addition to loss reserves of an exactly equal 
amount (because it is a break-even policy) would be taken as a deduction. Over 
time, there would be additional deductions for successive loss payments, but 
they would be matched by equal and opposite changes in the level of loss re- 
serves. In addition, there would be deductions as the value of discounted loss 
reserves increased by  virtue of  the approach to future payout points. These 
deductions would give rise to negative underwriting income. They would be 
matched by  the yield on the use of funds up until the time of  payout, which 
would give rise to positive investment income, offsetting underwriting losses. 
So the company’s net taxable income would be zero throughout the life of the 
contract. (In appendix A, we provide further discussion of  the discount rate 
appropriate for use in setting loss reserves, drawing on the analogy between a 
single-payment spot policy and a discount bond.) 
Taxes with statutory accounting for loss reserves. With statutory accounting for 
loss reserves, the story is different. The premium comes in as gross income when 
received, but the simultaneous deduction is of the undiscounted reserve. The in- 
crease in liabilitjj on a discounted basis that takes place as the time of future pay- 
ment approaches has no tax consequences. As with nominal economic income 
accounting, loss payments give rise to a deduction when made, offset by a simul- 
taneous reduction in the deduction for loss reserves as the stock of undiscounted 
liabilities for losses incurred is reduced by the amount paid out. So, with statu- 
tory accounting  used for taxpurposes, writing what would be a break-even insur- 
ance policy in the absence of taxes results in a stream of changes in tax liabilities 
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In working out the details, we need to take account of the fact that the com- 
pany will evaluate cash flows on the basis of their after-tax consequences, us- 
ing the after-tax discount rate. In the case of a constant tax rate, T,  the after-tax 
discount rate applicable to a cash flow t years in the future is (1 -  T)r(t). 
With statutory accounting, there is a deduction for the undiscounted loss 
reserve at the time of  writing the policy, R(0) = L. The cash flow associated 
with the policy is thus (1 -  T)P  + TL  at time of issue, followed by the flow -l(t) 
at subsequent time t consisting of the actual loss payout. Since the payout is 
deducted and the corresponding  increase in loss reserves is included in taxable 
income, there are no tax consequences at payout time. Denoting the break-even 
premium under statutory accounting by Ps,  it must satisfy the break-even con- 
dition 
(1 -  T)P  + TL  = j;Z(t)e+T)r(f)dt. 
Two important characteristics  of the impact of taxes using statutory account- 
ing can be inferred from this break-even condition. First, the tax rate matters. 
As we show next, the higher the tax rate, the lower the break-even premium, 
given the term structure of before-tax interest rates. Second, the time pattern 
of  tax rates matters. For example, other things equal, the lower the tax rate 
anticipated in the future, relative to the time of writing the policy, the lower 
the break-even premium. Conversely, an anticipated increase in the rate of tax 
will result in an increase in the break-even premium. 
We  may  contrast this break-even condition with the condition that would 
apply under nominal economic income accounting, which would involve an 
initial deduction  of the discounted value of the anticipated loss, followed by a 
stream of deductions for any increase in that discounted value due to the ap- 
proach of  the payment date. (There is a further stream of deductions for the 
payments themselves that is offset by exactly equal reductions in the stock of 
reserves.) Letting Rd stand for the discounted value of loss reserves, the cash 
flow at the time of writing the policy would be (1 -  T)P  + 7Rd(0), or 
(1 -  T)P  + ?/;Z(t)e-“ dt. 
Under our assumption that the losses on the policy are known at the outset, the 
discounted value of losses remaining to be paid at a time t’ subsequent to the 
date of issue would be given by 
Rd(t’) = ~,~Z(f)e-~f-z’)  dt. 
The change in discounted reserve is a deduction in calculating nominal eco- 
nomic income and so would induce a stream of tax savings under a system of 
nominal economic income taxation. The rate of cash flow at t’ would then be 
-Z(t?  + .rrRd(t’), 48  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
where we have used the fact that, net of payouts, the stock of discounted re- 
serves will grow instantaneously at the rate of  interest. Denoting the break- 
even premium under nominal economic income accounting by P,  it must sat- 
isfy the break-even condition 
(1 - -7)P"  + ~Rd(0)  = j:[l(t')  - ~rRd(r')]e-(~-~)"'dr'. 
Relying on the discussion in appendix A, we know that this break-even condi- 
tion implies P  =  Rd(0). 
The relationship between the two break-even premium levels can be ex- 
pressed in simple form in the case of  a single-payment policy. The after-tax 
cash flow from the break-even premium under statutory accounting must have 
a discounted (at the after-tax discount rate) value of zero: 
p -  7(pS -  1)  - e-(I-T)rT  = 0 
7,  (1 - 7)p  = e<l-T)rT - 
e-u-.i)rr  -  -7 
1--7 
p"= 
A somewhat startling implication of the calculation is that the break-even loan 
proceeds to justify a repayment of one after a time period T could actually be 
negative for large enough values of  T, r, or -7.  The insurer could afford to pay 
the policyholder to accept coverage, taking its return in the form of tax savings. 
This may  be contrasted with the corresponding break-even premium, P", 
under nominal economic income accounting for tax purposes, 
pe  = Te-rT. 
The ratio of the two 
P  - eTrT  - 7erT 
P"  1-7 
-  __ 
depends on the tax rate, the discount rate, and the time to maturity (length of 
the tail for an insurance policy). If the tax rate is zero or the discount rate is 
zero or the time to maturity is zero, the two amounts are the same. Increasing 
the tax rate, the discount rate, or the time to maturity lowers the ratio, that is, 
lowers the break-even amount under statutory relative to that under nominal 
economic income accounting. For a high enough discount rate, tax rate, or time 
to maturity, the competitive premium level is negative, whereas the premium is 
always positive under nominal economic income accounting. 
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time to maturity) and the ratio between break-even premium levels under statu- 
tory and nominal economic income accounting is highly nonlinear. Table 2.2 
shows that, with a tax rate of 30 percent, the impact increases dramatically as 
the interest rate goes above 10 percent and the time to payoff goes beyond 10 
years. Since the relevant discount rate is the nominal interest rate, it is clear 
that the recent history of interest rates in the United States includes periods in 
which the premiums on long-tailed lines of insurance might have been signifi- 
cantly affected by tax factors. 
Aside on tax-exempt interest. In the analysis thus far we have assumed that the 
rate at which the company discounts after-tax cash flows is the after-tax interest 
rate. In practice, an important feature of the tax landscape is the option to hold 
state and local tax-exempt bonds. We  propose not to explore in any depth the 
maximizing financial portfolio choices by insurance companies. However, to 
the extent that tax-exempt interest applies at the margin to financial choices by 
the company, it would be substituted for the after-tax interest rate in our analy- 
sis. Essentially, the effect is to substitute for the actual marginal tax rate the, 
lower, implicit marginal tax rate embodied in the difference between tax- 
exempt and taxable bond yields. So, for example, if the tax-exempt interest 
rate is 8 percent and the taxable interest rate is 10 percent, the tax rate implicit 
in the tax-exempt yield would be 20 percent. If  the relevant margin for the 
insurance company is the tax-exempt bond, then the formulas above should 
employ the implicit marginal tax rate of 20 percent (as applied to the taxable 
interest rate) rather than the statutory tax rate. 
An insurance company that is well managed from a tax point of view will, 
however, try to assure that the marginal source of funds for the insurance busi- 
ness is fully taxable income. Note that whereas the insurance company’s tax 
rate does not enter the determination of the break-even premium level under 
nominal economic income accounting, it does enter under statutory account- 
ing. In the latter case, the higher the tax rate, the lower the break-even pre- 
mium, other things equal. It is characteristic of  situations in which the yield 
from an investment according to taxable income measurement rules incorpo- 
rates deferral relative to nominal economic income rules that the taxpayer with 
the higher marginal tax rate will be willing to pay the higher price for a given 
investment opportunity (Bradford 1981). In those situations, there will be a 
tendency for higher marginal rate taxpayers to drive exempt or low-rate taxpay- 
ers out of activities.  In the case of insurance companies, with statutory account- 
ing used for tax purposes, the same tendency is present. To the extent that an 
insurance business can be arranged so that the marginal underwriting loss 
comes out of fully taxable income, the company will be able to take full advan- 
tage of the deferral effect of the statutory accounting. (For a thorough treat- 
ment of these issues, in particular the financial portfolio choices of insurance 
companies, see Cummins and Grace 1994.) Table 2.2  Break-Even  Premiums for Statutory versus Nominal Economic Income Accounting 
7 = 0.1  r = 0.3  T = 0.5 
Maturity  r=0.05  r=0.1  r=0.15  r=0.2  r=0.05  r=0.1  r=0.15  r=0.2  r=0.05  r=0.1  r=0.15  r=0.2 
1  1  .00  1  .00  1  .oo  1  .oo  1  .00  1  .oo  1  .oo  0.99  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.99 
3  1  .00  0.99  0.99  0.98  1  .00  0.98  0.96  0.93  0.99  0.97  0.94  0.88 
10  0.98  0.93  0.79  0.54  0.95  0.76  0.32  -0.56  0.92  0.58  -0.25  -1.95 
20  0.93  0.54  -0.73  -4.41  0.76  -0.56  -5.09  -18.66  0.58  -1.95  -11.12  -39.82 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nore: Table reports ratio of break-even premium for single-payment policy under statutory accounting relative to that under nominal economic income accounting. 51  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
Taxes with statutorily prescribed discounted reserves. As described in section 
2.3, since TRA86, insurance companies have been required to use discounted 
reserves in calculating taxable income. As far as spot policies are concerned, 
it would be reasonable to describe the post-TRA86 rules as taxing companies 
roughly on a nominal economic income basis. As described above, however, 
the rules limit the flexibility of insurance companies to vary the loss profile 
assumed in calculating income, and they incorporate an assumed interest rate 
that may be different from the one actually prevailing. To illustrate, suppose 
the prescribed profile were “too long,” T’ instead of  T for our single-payment 
example, and the interest rate “too low,” r’  instead of r. Then, unlike the case 
of  consistent nominal economic income accounting, the tax rate and interest 
rates would influence the break-even premium, P. As a consequence, it is nec- 
essary to model the determination of break-even premiums using an explicit 
specification of the Treasury discount factors. 
2.4.2  From Break-Even Spot Prices to Earned Premiums 
The theoretical analysis developed above relates to the economics of a spot 
policy. A standard policy incorporates a year’s worth of spot policies, paid for 
at the beginning of the year. To get from spot policy prices to standard policy 
prices requires discounting the anticipated spot policy amounts. The income 
tax also affects the relationship between break-even spot prices and break-even 
standard policies, via the treatment of unearned premium reserves (which was 
changed in 1986). 
Industry data on premiums take the form of amounts earned during the re- 
porting year. The amount earned during a reporting year constitutes the pro 
rata portions of  premiums on standard policies that commenced during the 
previous year or that extend into the next accounting year. These amounts may 
be differentially affected by changes in the rates of tax during these years. 
Appendix B describes how we deal with these and many other details in the 
process of developing the figures presented in the next section, which describes 
the empirical results. 
2.5  Empirical Results 
2.5.1  Profiles, Tax Rates, Discount Rates, and IRS Reserve 
Discount Factors 
To  implement the formulas derived above we require data on loss profiles, 
taxes, discount rates, and IRS discount factors (for unpaid loss reserves). 
Profiles 
A unit loss profile in a line of insurance is assumed to take the form of  a 
sequence of  discrete payments, lj, occurring at times, tj, measured from the 52  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
Table 2.3  Unit Spot Policy Loss  Profiles Based on ”Iry Data (percent) 
Auto  Other  Workers’  Medical  Farmowners, 
Tax Year  Liability  Liability  Compensation  Malpractice  etc. 
AY  + 0 
AY  + 1 
AY  + 2 
AY  + 3 
AY  + 4 
AY  + 5 
AY  + 6 
AY  + 7 
AY  + 8 
AY  + 9 
AY  + 10 
AY  + 11 
AY  + 12 
AY  + 13 
AY  + 14 























































































Source: Derived from A. M. Best Company (1988). 
time of  writing. Since this is a unit profile, the payments sum to one. The 
specific profiles we use are based on those promulgated by the IRS in connec- 
tion with the development of reserve discount factors. Those profiles are de- 
rived by the Treasury in a somewhat ad hoc manner from data on the percent- 
age of  incurred losses paid by  the end  of  the reported  accident year  and 
successive years,  using  the  historical record  as  an  approximation to  the 
forward-looking profiles one would actually like to know. 
We distinguish five unit spot policy loss profiles, based on the aggregation 
of industry data by the lines of insurance as they were defined by the industry 
until 1989 (at which point data began to be reported in somewhat finer detail 
and the lines were disaggregated into more categories). The pre-1989 lines are 
“auto liability,” “other liability,” “workers’ compensation,” “medical malprac- 
tice,” and “farmowners, homeowners, and commercial multiple peril, ocean 
marine, aircraft (all perils), and boiler and machinery.” 
Table 2.3 presents the Treasury profiles as specified in connection with de- 
riving the reserve discount factors applicable after 1986. We have extended the 
profiles to 16 years, assuming all losses are paid by the end of the fifteenth year 
after the accident year. 
As discussed in appendix B, we translate these profiles into assumed spot 
policies by treating the first payout as occurring as a discrete amount exactly 
three months after the time of writing, and the successive payouts as discrete 
amounts occurring on the anniversary dates. So a typical profile in this applica- 53  Effects of Tax Law  Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
Table 2.4  Average Time to Payout by Line 
Line 
Average Time to Payout 
(years) 
Auto liability  1.57 
Other liability  4.38 
Workers’ compensation  3.12 
Medical malpractice  6.34 
Farmowners, etc.  1.17 
Source: Authors’ calculations  based on data from A. M. Best Company (1988). 
tion involves a payout at the .25, 1, 2, . . . ,  etc. year points. It is immediately 
apparent from the table that there is considerable variation in the length of the 
tails of the different lines. Based on our assumed timing, the average times to 
payout implicit in the data are shown in table 2.4. Referring to table 2.2, show- 
ing the effect of the difference between statutory and discounted reserve ac- 
counting for tax purposes, we can see that the only line for which we might 
look for a significant effect is medical malpractice. 
Anticipated Tax Rates 
Tax rates have changed from time to time. The break-even premium under 
statutory accounting depends on the company’s anticipation of future tax rates. 
Sometimes tax legislation specifies the future course of tax rates. For purposes 
of this exercise, we assume that companies know the tax rate that will, in fact, 
apply to the year of writing the policy (the first of two accident years that will 
be touched by the policy) and for future years believe the tax rates specified in 
legislation as of the end of the accident year.  (We also assume in this paper 
that companies do not manipulate their loss reserves.) Table 2.5 specifies the 
tax rates used in our calculations for each year. The rates shown on the diagonal 
are the rates that actually applied in the years in question. The last column, for 
1993, is repeated for all future years required in the calculations. 
Discounting 
In determining the spot price at any time, discounting is at the then-current 
term structure of  interest rates. The interest rate data that we use are in the 
form of yields on Treasury securities of different maturities. Although such a 
yield is derived as an internal rate of return on securities that make periodic 
coupon  payments  between  issue  date  and  maturity, we  treat  the  rates  as 
applying to zero-coupon bonds with various maturities. So, if  the five-year 
yield is reported as 7 percent, we assume $1 payable in five years can be bought 
for e-.07*5  = e-.35.  The after-tax interest rate applicable to a 40 percent bracket 
taxpayer would be 4.2 percent. We use the notation r(t)  to designate the interest 
rate applicable to a zero-coupon bond of maturity t.  Where the relevant matu- 
rity does not correspond exactly to a maturity available in the data (e.g., four Table 2.5  Federal Income Tax Rates Used in Calculating Break-Even Premiums 
Tax Rates in 
Tax Rates 
Anticipatedin  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
1976  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48 
1977  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48 
1978  .48  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1979  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1980  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1981  .46  .46  ,415  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1982  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1983  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1984  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1985  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46 
1986  .46  .4  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34 
1987  .4  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34 
1988  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34 
1989  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34 
1990  .34  .34  .34  .34 
1991  .34  .34  .34 
1992  .34  .34 
1993  .35 
Source: Commerce  Clearing House, Standnrd Federal Tax Reponer (Chicago, 1996). 1: pP3265.0129-.0139. 
Note: State tax rates have been ignored. 55  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
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Fig. 2.1  Term structure of interest rates, selected dates 
Source: Federal Reserve Board and authors' calculations. 
Note:  Average bond yields for various maturities, selected dates. Dates correspond to extrema in 
the 10-year yield. 
years), we use a linear interpolation of the rates reported for the nearest adja- 
cent maturities. 
We calculate spot prices for policies written on 1  April and 1 October (more 
precisely, the first business days of the second and fourth quarters) each year. 
The applicable  term structures are derived as simple averages of the term struc- 
tures, compiled on a daily basis by the Federal Reserve Board, during the first 
and second halves of the year. Figure 2.1 shows the term structure at selected 
dates (the turning points in the 10-year yield in the constructed time series). 
We  use the notation a(t)  for the after-tax discount factor applied to a cash 
flow at time point t after the date of  issue of  a spot policy. These discount 
factors vary with the date of issue, in part because the term structure of before- 
tax interest rates varies and in part because the tax rates vary. The applicable 
tax rates for purposes of determining the break-even premium at any time are 
those anticipated at that time. Because the discrete payment profile that we use 
is an  approximation to a continuous profile, the applicable tax rate is obtained 
by averaging over the interval from zero to the time midway to the next discrete 
payment point. So, for example, if T = 6, and the tax rate is 46 percent for the 
first year and 40 percent for the next five and a half years, the after-tax discount 
factor applicable to a cash flow at the six-year point is 
(1 - .46) + 5.5(1 - .40) 
6.5 56  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
Note that for this model we assume that the relevant tax rates are not the ones 
that actually prevailed in all instances. Rather, they are the tax rates that were 
expected to prevail at the date for which the after-tax discount factor is being 
derived. 
Reserve Discount Factors 
The reserve discount factors applied to undiscounted loss reserves for in- 
come tax purposes after 1986 are those promulgated by the Treasury in 1987 
and  1992. The factors provided in  1992 are for the post-1989 definition of 
lines. For our analysis, we use five of the six lines for which data are available 
before 1989. For the post-1989 period we have aggregated the more narrowly 
defined lines into the same five broader lines (auto liability, etc.). The reserve 
discount factors applied in 1992 and thereafter are obtained by  averaging the 
published IRS factors, using aggregate incurred losses in the disaggregated 
lines for the year as weights. 
2.5.2  Calculated Spot Premiums, 1976-93 
Tables 2.6 to 2.10 show the calculated break-even spot premiums in each 
line of insurance from 1976 through 1993 based on our model in section 2.4. 
The figures shown are simple averages of the 1 April and 1 October spot policy 
premiums that we use in the derivation of break-even standard and break-even 
earned premiums. The tables also show the break-even spot premiums that 
would have been implied based on statutory accounting (undiscounted loss 
reserves) and nominal economic income accounting for tax purposes through- 
out the series of years. For the years up to 1986, the applicable  tax law is based 
on statutojl accounting for loss reserves. After 1986, reserves are discounted 
for tax purposes. The special fresh-start rules applied in  1986. The column 
headed “Ratio of P(ATL) to P(NE1)” indicates the influence on the break-even 
spot premiums of the deviation of the applicable tax law accounting from the 
nominal economic income accounting applied to ordinary borrowing and lend- 
ing. After 1986, this ratio also indicates how closely the Treasury’s rules repli- 
cated nominal economic income accounting. The column headed “Ratio of 
P(ATL) to P(SA)” indicates the impact of the change in rules in 1986. 
Referring to table 2.4, we see that the calculated break-even spot premiums 
have the expected relationship to the length of  the tail in a line. In 1978, for 
example, the break-even premium under the applicable tax law was 0.9 1 in the 
farmowners, etc., line (the line with the shortest tail) and 0.55 in the medical 
malpractice line (the line with the longest tail). The differences were more 
pronounced in the early 1980s when interest rates were very high by historical 
standards. In 1981, the break-even price in the farmowners, etc., line was 0.85 
and in the medical malpractice line was 0.36. 
The difference between break-even prices under statutory accounting and 
applicable tax law accounting after 1986 also corresponds to the expectations 
based on the average length of the tails. As expected, the case where the differ- 
ence is most pronounced is medical malpractice, where the change from undis- Table 2.6  Break-Even Spot Premiums for Auto Liability, 1976-93 
P under 
P under Nominal  P under  Ratio of  Statutory  Ratio of 
Economic Income,  Applicable Tax  P(ATL) to  Accounting,  P(ATL) to 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
Table 2.7  Break-Even Spot Premiums for Other Liability, 1976-93 
P under 
P under Nominal  P under  Ratio of  Statutory  Ratio of 
Economic Income,  Applicable Thx  P(ATL) to  Accounting,  P(ATL) to 
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Source: Authors' calculations. Table 2.8  Break-Even Spot Premiums for Workers’ Compensation, 1976-93 
P under 
P under Nominal  P under  Ratio of  Statutory  Ratio of 
Economic Income,  Applicable Tax  P(ATL) to  Accounting,  P(ATLj to 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 2.9  Break-Even Spot Premiums for Medical Malpractice, 1976-93 
P under 
P under Nominal  P under  Ratio of  Statutory  Ratio of 
Economic Income,  Applicable Tax  P(ATLj to  Accounting,  P(ATLj to 
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Table 2.10  Break-Even Spot Premiums for Farmowners, etc., 197693 
P under 
P under Nominal  P under  Ratio of  Statutory  Ratio of 
Economic Income,  Applicable Tax  P(ATL) to  Accounting,  P(ATL) to 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
counted to discounted loss reserves accounts for a difference of  13 percent in 
the break-even *price  in 1987, declining to a roughly 4 percent difference in 
1993.  The impact of the fresh-start  rules in 1986 (which gave an extra tax boost 
to loss reserves established in 1986 and earlier) meant that for that year the tax 
law change reduced the break-even price below what it would have been under 
statutory accounting. The particularly large effect of  the tax law change in 
1987 reflects in part the impact of the declining rate of tax from 1986 to 1988. 
Under statutory accounting for tax purposes, a declining rate of tax between 
the receipt of  premium and the policy payout results in a lower break-even 
premium. The pattern of  declines in the impact of tax reform on break-even 
premiums after 1987 presumably results from declining interest rates (at a zero 
rate of interest the two should be the same) since there were no major changes 
in the tax rates after that point. 
Comparing the columns of break-even prices under nominal economic in- 
come accounting for tax purposes with the effect of the actual tax law in the 
period from 1987 onward (i.e., after the fresh-start rule had ceased to have any 
influence), we see that the two are very close. The ratios are essentially one 
throughout, for all lines, suggesting the Treasury succeeded in implementing 
the presumed objective of the 1986 shift to discounted loss reserves. 60  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
2.5.3 
In getting to the break-even earned premiums, we  calculated break-even 
standard policy premiums in each line of insurance for 1 April and 1 October 
from 1976 through 1993.  The difference between these premiums and the spot 
premiums presented above is that the standard policy premiums incorporate 
the effect of changes in the treatment of unearned premium reserves (a minor 
effect) and bring to an earlier time point the effect on premiums of changes in 
interest rates and tax rules. Thus a premium on a policy written on 1 October 
1986, incorporates the effect of  tax changes manifested in break-even spot 
premiums during most of  1987. 
2.5.4  Predicted Break-Even Premiums versus Actual Earned Premiums, 
Accident Years 1977-93 
Under competitive conditions, the opportunity for profit from all sources, 
including tax saving, will tend to be driven to zero. Thus we assume that the 
tax saving is “passed along” to the buyer of the policy in the form of a reduced 
premium. To make the comparison of the calculated  break-even premiums with 
industry data, we make use of  the break-even earned premium concept dis- 
cussed above. Table 2.11 presents these premiums, for accident years 1977-93 
(1976 is lost in the derivation of  earned premiums), together with the unit 
earned premiums implicit in industry data for these accident years, interpreted 
as the inverse of the loss ratio reported at the end of each accident year. For 
each line of  insurance, there are two columns, one showing the break-even 
earned premium (“B-E Earned P”) calculated from our model and one showing 
the ratio of  earned premiums per dollar of losses incurred (“lhndustry Loss 
Ratio”) registered in data for the industry for the year in question. So, for ex- 
ample, our calculated average of the break-even premiums for the unit standard 
policies contributing to earned premiums in the other liability line in 1985 was 
0.58. The ratio of  earned premiums to losses incurred in that line in that year 
was 0.81. The observed average “price” was higher than would be predicted 
by our calculation. 
In evaluating these figures, one needs to keep in mind that our calculations 
are highly stylized, neglecting risk premiums in the discount rates, for ex- 
ample. We would hope to see a relationship between the calculated and the 
observed prices, not necessarily equality. One important influence on the em- 
pirical ratios is the fact that industry data relate to premiums earned gross of 
the cost of  acquiring the policies, whereas our calculations would apply to 
premiums net of  acquisition costs. Best’s reports the following figures for 
“other underwriting expenses” incurred, as a ratio to premiums earned, in the 
reporting years: 1990 (26.36 percent), 1989, (26.25 percent), 1988 (25.97 per- 
cent), 1987 (25.95 percent), and 1986 (26.77 percent). Data disaggregated by 
line, available for 1990, are shown in table 2.12. 
To permit more ready comparison of  the relationship between calculated 
Calculated Standard Policy Premiums, 1976-93 Table 2.11  Break-Even Earned Premiums and Observed Loss Ratios by Line, 1W7-93 
Auto Liability  Other Liability  Workers’ Compensation  Medical Malpractice  Farmowners,  etc. 
lfindustry  Accident  Ifindustry  Ifindustry  lhdustry  lhdustry 




























































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations and  A. M. Best Company (various years). 62  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
Table 2.12  Other Underwriting Expenses by  Line, 1990 
Ratio of “Other 
Underwriting 
Expenses” Incurred  Premiums Written  Other Underwriting 
to Premiums  in  1990  Expenses 
Line  Written in 1990  (thousand $)  (thousand $) 
Auto  23.9  60,042,447  14,374,550 
Other liability  26.3  17,217,566  4,528,220 
Workers’ compensation  17.6  30,957,411  5,448,504 
Medical malpractice  15.5  4.01 4,622  622,266 
Farmowners, etc.  34. I  44,032,383  15,OO2,167 
Source: A. M. Best Company (1991). 
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Fig. 2.2  Auto liability: break-even earned premium and inverse loss ratio, 
Source: Authors’ calculations and A. M. Best Company (various years). 
1977-93 
and empirical prices, we present in figures 2.2 to 2.6 plots of normalized break- 
even prices and unit earned premiums in the data for the five lines. For each 
line of  insurance four lines are graphed, plotting the break-even earned pre- 
mium (“Break-Even Earned Premium,” our calculated amount), the break-even 
earned premium with statutory accounting (“Break-Even Earned Premium, 
SA,” also calculated, showing what the break-even premium would have been 
under continuation of the pre-1986 tax law), the estimated average unit pre- 
mium in the industry data (“Inverse Loss Ratio”), and the same average unit o.20 t 
+Inverse  Loss  Ratio 
+74%  of Inverse Loss  Ratii 
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Fig. 2.3  Other liability: break-even earned premium and inverse loss ratio, 
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Fig. 2.5  Medical malpractice: break-even earned premium and inverse loss 
ratio, 1977-93 
Source: Authors’ calculations and A. M. Best Company (various years). 65  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
premium deflated by the acquisition cost, represented by the ratios of  “other 
underwriting  expenses” to  premiums  written  in  1990, assumed  constant 
throughout (“X% of Inverse Loss Ratio”). The two key graphs from the point 
of view of assessing the predictive power of the calculated break-even prices 
on the industry results are “Break-Even Earned Premium” and “X% of Inverse 
Loss Ratio.” For the short-tailed lines (auto liability and farmowners, etc.), the 
two graphs arguably track reasonably closely. For the longer tailed lines, for 
which the discount rate is much more important, the industry data display large 
variation relative to the path of the calculated break-even prices and generally 
lie above the calculated levels. Taking the industry loss reserve data at face 
value, they reveal the highly risky nature of  the long-tailed insurance lines. 
Except for the very longest tailed line, medical malpractice, the variation in 
the calculated prices (due, mainly, to variation in interest rates) is very small 
relative to the variation in the industry results. 
Finally, the comparison of  the two calculated price graphs (“Break-Even 
Earned Premium” and “Break-Even Earned Premium, SA”) allows an assess- 
ment of the importance of changes in tax rules as an explanatory factor in the 
time series of  industry results. The graphs suggest that the impact of  the 
changes in tax law in 1986 was small relative to the other factors that influence 
the average level of industry prices. 
2.6  Conclusion 
One bottom-line conclusion of our investigation is that the effect of changes 
in  tax law is small relative to the other forces that bear on variation in the 
average price of  property-casualty insurance. The other major conclusion, 
taken from the tables of break-even spot premiums, is that the 1986 reforms 
could account for an increase in the predicted price of insurance ranging from 
next to nothing for the very short tailed lines to 5 or 6 percent in the longest 
tailed line, medical malpractice. If the 1986 reforms are understood as an ex- 
cise tax increase on long-tailed property-casualty insurance, perhaps the size 
of the predicted price effect is not a negligible amount, even if it is not large 
relative to the annual variation in the industry’s results. 
Appendix A 
Loss Reserve Discounting with Taxes 
In the presence of taxes, the appropriate discount rate for the company to use 
in evaluating after-tax cash flows is the after-tax rate of interest in the market. 
This is because the after-tax rate of interest expresses the opportunity available 
to the company to exchange dollars in one period for dollars in another. The 66  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
discount rate applied to the anticipated losses in deriving the reserves used in 
calculating nominal economic income is, however, the before-tax interest rate. 
To explain why this is so, consider an analogy with a company’s writing an 
insurance policy: floating a zero-coupon bond. The proceeds of the borrowing 
are analogous to the premium on the insurance policy. The single payment on 
the bond at maturity corresponds to tile payoff on a single-payment insurance 
policy. The analogy of the sale of  a policy by an insurance company with a 
loan from policyholder to the company has been noted by  others (see, e.g., 
Cummins and Grace 1994). 
The analogue to treating the premium as “gross income” of the insurance 
company would be treating the proceeds of  the borrowing as gross income. 
There would, however, be an immediate deduction of the discounted value of 
the payment anticipated at maturity. Subsequently, as the time for the company 
to repay the loan approached, its liability, the discounted value of its repayment 
obligation, would grow. In the income calculation, this growth in liability 
would be allowed as a deduction (it is simply accruing interest). Finally, at 
maturity, the company would pay  off  the loan, taking a  deduction for the 
amount paid, but taking into income the value of the liability, in equal amount, 
that it takes off its books at that point. 
Keeping the analogy with the unit single-payment spot policy, let the face 
value of  the discount bond be one, payable at time T after the date of  issue, 
time 0. Let r be the rate of  interest, and T the tax rate. Finally, let A be the 
amount received by the issuing company. The cash flow of the company at the 
moment of issuing the bond consists of the proceeds received, A, less the tax 
on A, treated as gross income, and plus the tax saving due to the deduction of 
the discouflted (at r) value of  one, payable T years in the future. (Note: In 
general, in this paper we treat taxes as though assessed and paid continuously.) 
Subsequently, the company obtains a deduction for the growth in value of its 
repayment obligation under the bond,  so there is a  stream of  tax  savings. 
At  maturity, the company pays  one and takes a  deduction of  this  amount 
in the calculation of  income for tax purposes (corresponding to the inclusion 
as gross income of  the premium). This deduction is, however, balanced by 
an equal inclusion in income of  the elimination of  the accrued value of  the 
liability for payment, corresponding to the write-down of loss reserves in the 
insurance context.  So  there  is no tax  consequence of  payoff  at  maturity. 
This three-part after-tax cash flow-a  lump sum received (net of tax), a flow 
of  tax savings, and a lump sum paid-will  be discounted by  the company 
at the after-tax interest rate. It remains to  show that the break-even  value 
of A is simply the payoff, one, discounted to time 0 at the before-tax rate of 
interest. 
The break-even condition is that the stream of net after-tax cash flows have 
a discounted (at the after-tax rate of interest) value of zero: 67  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
This simplifies to 
We can explicitly integrate to get 
This, in turn, simplifies to 
(1 - 7)A - (1 - 7)e-rT = 0, 
or 
A  = e-rT. 
After a bit of  work, we  get the expected answer: under nominal economic 
income taxation, the value of a discount bond, taking into account tax effects, 
is obtained by discounting the cash flow, exclusive of taxes, at the before-tax 
interest rate. 
Appendix B 
Details of the Calculations 
In this appendix we add details to the description in the body of the paper of 
the calculation of premiums for empirical implementation. 
Calculating Break-Even Spot Prices 
Break-Even Spot Prices under Nominal Economic Income Accounting 
Under nominal economic income accounting,  the tax rate does not enter the 
determination of break-even spot prices. The break-even spot premium is sim- 
ply the discounted value of the loss payments, using the before-tax discount 
rate. So the break-even spot premium for a general policy with loss profile 
specified by the sequence, 4, is given by 
Break-Even Spot Prices under Statutory Accounting for Tax Purposes 
(he-TRA86) 
rity T,  in the pre-1986 tax regime is given by 
The break-even spot premium for a single-payment spot policy, with matu- 68  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
(1 - 7)P(T) + 7  = e-('+fl'77 
provided there is no anticipated change in the tax rate. If  a change in tax rate 
is anticipated, the exponent in the discount factor on the right-hand side is 
modified, as discussed in the body of the paper. 
The break-even spot premium for a general policy with loss profile specified 
by the sequence 1,  (to simplify, again assuming no change in the applicable tax 
rate) is given by 
(1 - T)P({<})  + T  =  ~<e+T)fl$)~. 
j 
Break-Even Spot Prices with Discounted Loss Reserves (Post-TRA86) 
For policies written after 31 December 1986, prescribed reserve discount 
factors are applied to loss reserves at year end, the factors depending on the 
line of insurance. As we have done in the analysis of break-even prices with 
statutory accounting, we assume that tax liabilities are calculated continuously 
so that the gross premium income and initial loss reserve deductions are effec- 
tively realized immediately on writing a new spot policy. In the case of dis- 
counted loss reserves, there is a sequence of  additions that result from the 
passing of time. 
To illustrate the way  the discount factors enter the break-even conditions, 
let the reserve discount factors applied at the moment of writing, on the first 
anniversary, and so on, be denoted fo, f,,  f,, etc. For a single-payment spot 
policy, the factors are increasing, as the undiscounted loss reserve remains con- 
stant until the moment of  payment. The discount factors thus reflect the ap- 
proach in time of the single payment. For a more general policy, the discount 
factors may decrease, as the effective length of the remaining tail of payments 
may increase as the early payments are realized. In the case of a unit single- 
payment spot policy with maturity T (taken to be an integer), assuming a con- 
stant tax rate, the break-even condition is 
(1 - T)P(Z')  + T-  + T(X -  fg)e+l-')fll)  + 7(f, -  jJe+1-T)f12)2  +  . . . 
On the left-hand side are included the tax savings due to the successive addi- 
tions to loss reserves owing to the passing of time. The last term on the left is 
the tax saving due to any divergence of the last value of the discounted reserve 
from unity. On the right-hand side is the discounted loss payment. 
If the tax rate is varying over time, the value of the deductions and the after- 
tax discount factors will be affected in the manner discussed in general terms 
above and spelled out in detail below. 
Using Line-Specijc Reserve Discount Factors 
If we were provided with the appropriate discount factors for each possible 
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era1 spot policy, with loss profile specified by a sequence of loss payments, by 
treating each separate payment as a single-payment spot policy, using the for- 
mula above, then adding the premiums together. 
For our purposes, there are two problems with the discount factors provided 
by the IRS. First, they are designed to apply to an aggregation of policies over 
a one-year period, rather than spot policies. Second, they apply to a given line, 
rather than to single-payment spot policies. 
The first reserve discount factor specified by the IRS is to be applied to the 
reserve in the relevant line on the company’s books at the end of  the initial 
accident year. Conceived of in terms of an aggregate of spot policies, this re- 
serve includes amounts remaining to be paid on policies ranging in age from 
one year (written on 1 January) to zero years (written on 31 December). The 
IRS reserve discount factor is based on a spot policy written on  1 July. It is 
thus “too close” to the loss payout (i.e., too high) compared to the factor appro- 
priate for the actual payout pattern associated with a newly written spot policy. 
Compared with the policy written a year earlier, the IRS factor is six months 
“too far” from the actual payouts (so, too low). As an approximation, we apply 
this factor to the undiscounted loss reserve (equal to one for a unit policy) 
associated with a newly written spot policy. That is, we allow an immediate 
deduction of this first factor at the time of writing a unit spot policy. 
The development of the further reserve deductions, associated with the grad- 
ual increase in the reserve discount factor as the payout time approaches, is 
complicated by the fact that the IRS reserve discount factors are specified by 
line of insurance, rather than by  timing of  single payments. As will be dis- 
cussed, because of the way cumulative loss data are reported, we approximate 
the loss profile in a given line as involving discrete loss payments at the three- 
month point from the date of writing a spot policy, followed by payouts on the 
anniversary dates. In our treatment of the payout profiles as known with cer- 
tainty,  an equal reduction in  the (undiscounted) unpaid  loss reserve corre- 
sponds to each loss payout. 
The taxable income calculation brings into income the decline in discounted 
reserves during the year and allows a deduction of the loss payments during the 
year. Using the notation L(t)  for the Cumulative payments up to and including 
t, the path of undiscounted reserves for a unit policy is given by  1, (1 -  L( l)), 
(1 -  L(2)), etc., at the outset and at successive anniversaries. The path of dis- 
counted reserves is thus given byf,,f,(l  -  L(l)),f2(l -  L(2)),  etc. The taxable 
income associated with a unit policy is thus P -f, at the moment of writing, 
&-f,(l  -L(l))-L(l)inthefirstyear,f,(l  -L(l))-f2(l  -L(2))-(L(2)-L(l)) 
in the second year,  and so on. In the last year, the taxable income will be 
The IRS cumulative loss profiles specify amounts regarded as paid as of six 
months from the time of writing the policy in a line, 1.5 years, etc., through an 
assumed “last year.” Let the cumulative amount paid out at these successive 
points be denoted F,,  F,, etc., through F,.  For a unit policy, F, = 1. We  think 
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of  these cumulative payouts as derived from constant payout  rates over the 
interval in question. So the rate of loss payout would start at 2F0 for the first 
six months of the policy life (the factor of two comes from the fact that the 
interval to the first cumulation point is just half a year). The loss payout would 
continue at the rate of F, -  Fo for the period from .5 years to 1.5 years, at the 
rate of F2 -  F3  for the period from 1.5 years to 2.5 years, etc. 
The constant rates are in turn converted to discrete payments at the mid- 
points of the various intervals. So the first loss payout is taken to be Fo at the 
.25-year (three-month) point. The second payout is F, -  Fo at the midpoint 
between .5  years and 1.5 year, that is, at the one-year point. And so on. The 
last payout is FT -  FT-, = 1 -  FT-, at the T-year point. 
The formulas above assume constant tax rates. In the calculations, as sum- 
marized in  table 2B.1, the after-tax discount factors, a(t),  are based on the 
actual anticipated tax rates, which are also used to determine the projected tax 
consequences of future cash flows. 
Break-Even Spot Prices after TRA86: The Transition 
These descriptions apply to spot policies written in worlds governed entirely 
by either the pre- or post-TRA86 rules. It remains to determine the break-even 
price for a policy that crossed the boundary. Consider, for example, a single- 
payment spot policy written on 1 April 1986. An immediate deduction of the 
undiscounted loss reserve would apply at the moment of writing. Then, as of 
1 January 1987, it would begin to accrue additional deductions for the accruing 
value of its discounted reserve as of that date. These deductions would continue 
until the maturity date, at which point, ideally, the discounted reserve would 
equal the payoff amount. The tax effect of the loss deduction would, as usual, 
be offset by the write-down of the reserve associated with the policy. 
The fresh-start rule meant that, in effect, companies received tax deductions 
of  more than 100 percent of the amount of the losses. For policies that had 
already been written, this meant a gain to the companies,  but it had no incentive 
effect, no effect on the break-even prices. But to the extent a company could 
anticipate the fresh-start rule, there would be a downward effect on the break- 
even price. 
For purposes of this exercise, we assume that the fresh-start rules were built 
into break-even premiums starting 1 January 1986.  As will be discussed below, 
in application, we calculate spot prices as of the first day of the second and 
fourth quarters each year. So the fresh-start rules need to be taken into account 
for the two prices calculated for 1986. 
For the single-payment spot policy with maturity Z  written on 1  April 1986, 
the fresh-start rule meant an immediate deduction of one and then a stream of 
deductions, which we  treat as occurring on the anniversary dates, along the 
lines just discussed for the policy entirely in the post-TRA86 regime. For the 
case of a constant tax rate, the break-even condition is then Table 2B.1  Unit Spot Policy Cash Flows, Post-TRAM Rules 
Time (relative to issue  Payments/Receipts 
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The difference from the previous formula is that the first reserve deduction is 
worth T, instead of ~f,. 
Summing Up the Cases 
In all we calculate break-even spot prices under three sets of  assumptions 
about taxes: Under statutory accounting, the unit loss is deducted at the mo- 
ment of writing the policy. In terms of table 2B.1, the effect is to setx = 1 for 
all i.  Under applicable tax law, the same is true until 1986. From 1987 onward, 
the discount factors,A, prescribed by  the IRS apply. For 1986, the same dis- 
count factors apply for cash flows in 1987 and later, but taxable income in the 
1986 year of  writing the policy (but not on the anniversary) is based on& = 1. 
Under nominal economic income accounting the price is based on the cash 
flow of premium and payments only, without regard to taxes, using the discount 
factors based on before-tax interest rates. 
Calculating Standard Policy Premiums 
Accounting for the Time Structure of an Insurance Policy 
In order to calculate break-even premiums to compare with data we need to 
take account of the fact that the usual insurance policy covers events that occur 
during a specified period, usually a year, commencing with the date of issue. 
The premium is generally payable at the beginning of the policy year. At the 
moment of writing, there will have been no losses incurred, and so no addition 
to the loss reserve. As time passes, losses accumulate, and the company books 
incurred losses, basing its accounts on actual information (e.g., claims actually 
filed) and experience with similar insurance policies in the past. At the moment 
of writing the policy the company does acquire an asset, the premium paid or 
receivable, to which corresponds  the liability to provide coverage for the period 
covered. At the moment of writing, the coverage for which the premium is 
payment has yet to be delivered, so the liability to provide that coverage is 
carried on the books as an "unearned" premium reserve. By convention, the 
premium on a policy is treated as "earned" ratably over the policy period. 
The significance of these accounting details is, in part, the necessity they 
reveal of dealing with the distinction between premiums written, which are 
taken into income for both tax and regulatory purposes, and the set-aside for 
premiums not yet earned, which is allowed for in tax and statutory accounting. 
The tax rules with respect to unearned premium reserves were changed in 
TRA86, and we need to incorporate this change into our calculations. 
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ums received and earned is that the premium determined in our calculations 
will actually be earned over a period of time that will generally include more 
than one taxable year. Since tax rules generally apply to whole calendar years, 
the price of a policy that will span 1 January will need to incorporate  the chang- 
ing rules on the income as well as the deduction (loss reserves) side. 
A third reason is that industry data we examine relate to premiums earned, 
reported by accident year. Those premiums earned will be in part the playing 
out of policy years that began the year before the accident year in question and 
in part the initial phase of policies written during the accident year. If premi- 
ums were separately calculated and reported for coverage within a particular 
calendar year (so that a typical one-year policy written on  1 September 1987 
would have a premium for the period through 31 December 1987 and a pre- 
mium for the period 1 January through 31 August 1988), this would not create 
problems for us. But the convention that premiums are earned ratably over the 
policy period means that data on earned premiums may show a different pat- 
tern than year-by-year calculations would imply. 
To illustrate, suppose that the theory tells us that in some isolated year, say 
1983, the tax rules imply a very high spot premium relative to all other years. 
A company writing a one-year policy on 1 September 1982 could be thought 
of as writing two policies, a low-priced one for the last four months of  1982 
and a high-priced one for January-August  1983. There will be just one price, 
however,  intermediate between the two, which will be reported (and taxed) 
partly in 1982  and partly in 1983.  Premiums earned for accident year 1982  will 
thus include some of the effect of the 1983  tax rule changes (and thus be higher 
than would be predicted based just on  1982 tax rules), while the premiums 
earned in the 1983 accident year will include a residual influence of the pre- 
1983 rules. 
The analysis thus far of break-even spot premiums assumed that, at a given 
moment, the insurance company acquires a liability to make a known sequence 
of loss payments over time and inquired into the up-front payment that would 
make this a break-even proposition, taking into account the tax-implied tax 
payments. The fact that, in actuality, the company typically sells a whole year’s 
worth of spot policies at once influences the way we need to interpret data on 
loss reserves and earned premiums and, because of details of the treatment of 
the premium payment under the tax law, it affects the break-even formulas 
as well. 
For example, when an insurance company sells a medical malpractice  policy 
for a term of one year commencing on 1 September 1988, it knows that on 1 
September, with certain probabilities, an event will occur that will give rise to 
a claim and that the result will be a certain series of loss payments and ex- 
penses in the future. It knows the same for 2 September, and so on. The pre- 
mium it charges for this one-year policy is to pay for these 365 one-day poli- 
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of this situation, and we imagine the company as taking on 365 known liabili- 
ties. Thus one of the liabilities, incorporated in the premium as of 1 September, 
is to provide a stream of payments, starting 6 December, with the characteristic 
medical malpractice profile. 
In the absence of  taxes, this nicety would not matter much. The one-year 
premium would simply be the discounted value of the 365 spot premiums on 
the daily policies. With taxes, the nicety could matter because the spot prices 
may themselves vary over the year as the result of variation in the interest rates 
or in the tax rules themselves. But the tax system, in effect, treats the spot price 
as uniform throughout the policy year. (The single annual premium is treated 
as “earned” in proportion to the fraction of the policy year that has elapsed.) 
To explore this issue, consider the case of a loss payment profile on the spot 
policy whereby the first loss payment occurs .5 years after the covered day. 
After that, payments occur at one-year intervals. The loss reserve is set up on 
the date the policy is written. The new question to be considered is how tax 
law changes as of 1 January affect the analysis. 
For a policy written after 1 July, the loss payments are shifted by one year, 
in terms of the applicable tax law, compared with the policy written before 1 
July. So  if  interest rates are unchanged, for the case of  spot premiums (im- 
plying no unearned premium problem) there will be one premium before  1 
July and another one after 1 July. In going from the second half of one year to 
the first half  of  the next, there may  be a difference in spot premium (even 
given constant interest rates), owing to the taxation of the premium, net of loss 
reserve. This is why we calculate two spot prices for each year, using the inter- 
est rate conditions as of the beginning of April and October. 
Calculating Break-Even Standard Policy Prices 
The break-even premium on a standard policy is the amount the company 
must receive to finance the flow of premiums on the embedded implicit spot 
policies over the year. So the starting point for calculating it is the calculation 
of spot premiums. 
We assume that, looking forward from 1  April, the company correctly antici- 
pates the spot premiums that will prevail on 1 October of the current year and 
on 1 April of the next year. Our calculated break-even standard premium on 1 
April is based on the approximation of a single spot policy issued on 1 July of 
the current year and 1 January of the next year. The 1 July spot premium is the 
average of the spot premiums on 1 April and 1 October. The 1 January spot 
premium is the average of the 1 October spot premium and next year’s  1 April 
spot premium. These hypothetical spot premiums (1 July and 1 January) are 
discounted to 1 April. 
The analogous procedure is used to derive the 1 October standard premium 
each year. 
The detail to be resolved is the discount rate to apply to these spot premiums 
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Table 2B.2  Discounting from Spot to Standard Premium before TRA86 
After-Tax 
Cash Flows  1 October 1983  30 September 1984 
Up front  X  -  7(9/30/84)*~ 
spot  y -  'r(9/30/84)*y 
Standard Policy Prices with No Taxes 
In the absence of taxes, the break-even premium on a standard policy start- 
ing at a particular time would simply be the discounted (at the before-tax rate 
of  interest) value of  the flow of spot premiums over the year. In the case in 
which the unit spot premium is P and taxes and interest rates are constant, this 
will simply be 
Typical values of the multiplicative factor are .975, ,952, and .906 for r = .05, 
.lo, and .20, respectively. 
Standard Policy Prices before TRA86 
Taxes complicate the story. Consider the question: what payment must the 
company receive on 1 October 1983 to deliver a commitment to provide a unit 
spot policy on 30 September 1984 (i.e., the last day of the policy year)? In the 
pre-TRA86 regime, the 1 October 1983 payment, regarded as gross income, 
would have been offset by  an addition to the unearned premium reserve, so 
there would be no tax consequences at that point. On 30 September 1984, 
the unearned premium reserve would have been debited by the amount of the 
unearned premium reserve, resulting in an inclusion in taxable income. So if x 
is the 1 October 1983 payment and y is the 30 September 1984 spot premium, 
then the after-tax cash flows that need to be equated in value are summarized 
in table 2B.2. 
Carrying out the calculation for equating the values of the two cash flows, 
using the after-tax discount rate, yields (assuming constant tax rate) 
x(l -  Te+l-T)r  ) = y(1 - T)e+'-T)', 
or 
(1 -  T)e<l-T)r  -  x-  - 
y  1 - Te<r-T)r ' 
The implicit discount from spot to the element of  the standard premium that 
buys the last bit of  spot coverage in the policy year is found by  taking the 
negative of  the natural logarithm of  the right-hand side. For example, for 
I = 10 percent and T = 40 percent, the implicit discount rate is 9.8 percent. 76  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
Table 2B.3  Discounting from Spot to Standard after 1986 
After-Tax 
Cash Flows  1 October 1988  30 September 1989 
Up front  x -  ~(10/1/88)*.2x  -~(9/30/89)*.8~ 
spot  y -  ~(9/30/89)*y 
The example suggests that for the pre-TRA86 rules, one could safely derive 
standard premium prices from spot prices by discounting at the before-tax rate 
of return. We  adopt this approximation. 
Standard Policy Prices after 31 December 1986 
In the post-TRA86 regime, the company would be allowed a deduction from 
the 1 October 1988 payment of only 80 percent of the addition to the unearned 
premium reserve account, so there would be taxable income at that point. On 
30 September 1989, the reduction of the unearned premium reserve account 
by the amount of the spot premium would give rise to an inclusion in taxable 
income of 80 percent of  that amount. So if x is the 1 October 1988 payment 
and y is the 30 September 1989 spot premium, then the after-tax cash flows 
that need to be equated in value are as shown in table 2B.3. 
Using subscripts to indicate the timing of  the tax rates, the value of  x is 
given by 
x(1 - .27, - .8~,e-('-~2)')  = y(1 -  T,)e+T2)', 
(1 - T2)e-('-T2)r  -  x-  - 
y  1 - .2Tl - .8~~e-('-'~)' 
As table 2B.4 shows, the effect of the TRA86 change was to reduce slightly 
the implicit discount rate applicable to the end-of-year spot premium in de- 
termining the beginning-of-year standard premium (i.e., raise the break-even 
standard premium). The effect was enhanced by the pattern of tax rate changes 
in effect in 1987 and 1988. (For calendar year taxpayers, the rate was 40 per- 
cent in 1987 and 34 percent in 1988.) As a simplification, we ignored the effect 
of  the changed treatment of the unearned premium reserve except for 1987, 
when we based the discounting on one-half of the market rate. 
Transition from Pre- to Post-TRA86 Rules 
Just as special transition rules were enacted in connection with the change 
in the treatment of unpaid losses effected by TRA86, special rules also applied 
to the change in the treatment of the unearned premium reserve. As has just 
been discussed, according to TRA86, only 80 percent of the end-of-year stock 
of unearned premiums is allowed as a deduction. The effect is to exclude 20 77  Effects of Tax Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices 
Table 2B.4  Implicit Discount from End-of-Year  Spot to Beginning-of-Year 
Standard Premium, Post-TRAS6  Rules 
Ratio of  Implicit 














































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
percent of  the beginning-of-year stock from taxable income. Applied at the 
transition, 1 January 1987, the new rule would have implied forgiveness of tax 
on 20 percent of the then-outstanding stock of unearned premiums. Under spe- 
cial transition rules, that 20 percent was brought into income over a six-year 
period, one-sixth each year. 
Looking ahead from 1986, the transition treatment of unearned premiums 
for that year was actually more favorable than the preexisting regime since the 
return of unearned premiums to taxable income was slightly deferred and the 
tax rates at which the deferred premiums were included was lower than that at 
which they had been deducted. We decided to neglect this transitional effect 
in our calculations. 
Modeling the Annual Statement Data on Earned Premiums 
One more step is needed in getting to a break-even premium figure that can 
be compared to company or industry data on premiums earned during a partic- 
ular year. Let P(t),  temporarily, stand for the total of standard policy premiums 
written (by a company or for the industry) at time t,  representing prepayment 
of  coverage over the next year, where the current year begins at time 0. P(t) 
will give rise to a quantum (1 -  t)P(t)  of premiums earned in the current year 
and tP(t)  in the next year. With a constant flow of new policies, an average of 
one-fourth of the new premiums written in the first half of the year will show 
up the next year. An average of three-fourths of the new premiums written in 
the second half of the year will show up the next year. If the premiums written 
in the successive halves of calendar years are t,pZ,  4,  and 4,  the premiums 
reported as earned in year 2 will be 78  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
4 i-  34  i-  34  i-  p4 
4 
This is motivation for what we term the break-even earned premium. The 
break-even earned premium is a weighted average of unit standard premiums. 
It corresponds to the level of premiums earned during an accident year in the 
case of a company writing policies at a constant rate. Reinterpret 4,  p2,p3, and 
p4 as the unit standard premiums in the respective half-years (rather than totals 
of premiums written), thought of as centered in each half-year (1 April and 1 
October). The normalized break-even earned premium in year 2 is then 
4 i- 34  4-  34  -k  p4 
8 
This is the formula used in calculating the break-even earned premium. 
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